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Optimization of Number of Operators and Allocation of New 
Lines in an Oligopolistic Transit Market 
 
Zhi-Chun Li,1William H. K. Lam, S. C. Wong 
 
Abstract This paper proposes a novel model for determining the optimal number of transit 
operators and the allocation of new lines in an oligopolistic transit market. The proposed 
model consists of three interrelated sub-models that are associated with three types of players; 
namely, transit authority, transit operators, and transit passengers. In practice, the operating 
cost per unit of transit line of each operator is decreasing in the number of lines that it 
operates. These effects which are referred to as the scale economies of transit operations are 
explicitly incorporated in the proposed model. On the basis of a logit-type transit passenger 
travel choice sub-model with elastic demand, the fares and frequencies of transit services are 
determined by an oligopolistic competitive equilibrium model (i.e. transit operator sub-model). 
The transit authority sub-model for optimization of the number of operators and the allocation 
of new lines is expressed as a 0-1 integer programming problem. It can be solved by an 
implicit enumeration heuristic solution algorithm. Numerical results show that both the scale 
economies and the market demand level have significant impacts on the optimal number of 
operators and the allocation schemes of new lines. Ignoring the effects of scale economies on 
transit operations may lead transit authorities to make biased decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an accelerating trend towards the deregulation of transit 
systems, particularly in developing countries. This is attributed to the brief that the 
privatization and deregulation of urban transit services can offer the possibility of significant 
improvements in efficiency and reliability of the transit system (Lo and Yip, 2001). However, 
empirical studies by Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2005) and Ardila (2008) recently showed that 
transit service competition may to some extent lead to market failure, including oversupply of 
transit vehicles, inflated fares and low service quality. They also showed that transit systems 
that were initially privately owned were eventually regulated, when cities became 
increasingly reliant on transit modes as a mass people mover. The phenomenon was called the 
cycle of private and public involvement (Estache and Gomez-Lobo, 2005). 
 
Similar phenomenon has also recently occurred in Hong Kong. Specifically, the transit 
industry in Hong Kong has experienced several significant mergers in the past several years. 
Two (i.e., the New World First Bus Company and the Citybus Company) of five bus 
companies (wholly-owned by the private sector) were merged in 2003. More recently, the two 
railway corporations (i.e., the MTR and the KCR) in Hong Kong have also been merged. 
These mergers raise some intriguing and important questions. If this tendency persists, then 
will the number of operators in the transit market continue to reduce and finally arrive at a 
monopoly? How many operators are optimal in a transit market? How can the transit authority 
(e.g., the government) create a “win-win-win” regulatory or incentive environment in which 
private investors can procure more profits while providing high-quality services, passengers’ 
travel needs can be satisfied with affordable services, and society as a whole is better off than 
it was before? The solutions to these problems would have a long-term implication on 
sustainable transportation in which a sustainable public transportation system can be 
maintained and improved to support the urban development and growth, especially for cities 
that are characterized by low car ownership and compact urban structure, such as Hong Kong 
(Tong and Wong, 1997; Loo and Chow, 2008). 
 
To address these interesting issues, advanced models need to be developed to help us 
understand and assess the effects of competition in transit market with various numbers of 
transit operators. In general, the number of operators in a transit system will influence the 
strategies of competing operators in relation to service frequencies and fares, the travel choice 
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behavior of passengers, and the performance of the system itself. For example, the monopoly 
regime (i.e. a single operator in a market) and oligopoly regime (i.e. multiple operators in a 
market) can lead to a significant difference in the efficiency and reliability of the transit 
system. It is therefore very important that transit authorities optimize the number of operators, 
particularly in large Asian cities, such as Hong Kong. 
 
Significant progress has been made in transit system modeling over the past decades, 
particularly in modeling competition between transit operators (Harker, 1988; Fernandez and 
Marcotte, 1992; Zubieta, 1998; Lo et al., 2000, 2004; Zhou et al., 2005; Wang and Yang, 
2005). However, most of these existing studies have assumed that the number of operators in 
the transit market was given and fixed exogenously. Little attention has been paid to exploring 
the impacts of the number of operators on a transit system. Some exceptions are Williams and 
Abdulaal (1993) and Williams and Martin (1993), who studied the market behavior of an 
arbitrary number of operators under oligopolistic competition. However, their studies did not 
provide a methodology for the determination of the optimal number of operators in a transit 
market. Moreover, their models implicitly assumed that each of the operators in the market 
only operated a single transit line (i.e., the one-to-one assumption). In reality, the number of 
transit companies (or operators) in a city is far less than the number of transit lines. It implies 
that each transit company operates multiple transit lines. Thus, these models may not be able 
to address the problems with unequal numbers of transit lines and operators, such as the 
allocation problem of new transit lines, which is a timely problem in large Asian cities.  
 
For example, the transit markets in Hong Kong are partially regulated, and the bus services 
can be divided into three categories: franchised bus, public light bus or minibus (including red 
minibuses and green minibuses) and residential bus. In Hong Kong, some new transit lines 
(e.g., bus and/or railway lines) are proposed regularly and put into operation to accommodate 
the growing travel demands particularly in the newly developed outlying areas. The operating 
rights of these new lines are usually conferred by the Transport Department on one or several 
transit companies through competitive bidding exercise. Specifically, a transit company 
wishing to invest capital in an additional transit line has to bid for it in advance from the 
Transport Department, and if it is successful, the selected transit company is then granted a 
franchise for operating that line. This franchise for regular bus or green minibus routes is 
usually given to the existing transit companies or transit operators. However, for the third 
category of residential bus services, new transit companies would have the right to apply for 
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granting the license to provide the commuting services. Naturally, this raises another 
important issue, i.e., how should the authority allocate these new lines to bidders to create a 
“win-win-win” situation? 
 
In addition, the one-to-one assumption adopted in the models of Williams and Abdulaal (1993) 
and Williams and Martin (1993) also gives rise to another major limitation, i.e., the effects of 
the scale economies of transit operations cannot be considered properly. “Scale economies” 
means that the operating cost per unit of transit line of each operator decreases with the 
number of lines that it operates. A number of empirical studies have shown that these 
economies are commonplace in transit operations (Berechman and Giuliano, 1985; Savage, 
1997). Thus, it is necessary to incorporate the effects of scale economies into the allocation 
problem of new transit lines particularly in an oligopolistic transit market with competition. 
 
In view of the above, this paper proposes (1) to develop a novel model for simultaneously 
determining the optimal number of operators and the allocation of new lines in an 
oligopolistic transit market, (2) to incorporate the effects of scale economies on the transit 
system in the proposed model, (3) to develop a heuristic solution algorithm to solve the 
simultaneous optimization problem, and (4) to explore the effects of the allocation of 
additional lines, the scale economies and the transit market demand level. 
 
In order to facilitate the presentation of the essential ideas, this paper focuses on a transit 
market that consists of commuting trips between a residential area and an urban central area. 
In the proposed model, three types of players are involved. They are transit authority, transit 
operators, and transit passengers. The interactions between these three players result in a 
multi-level hierarchical system, as shown in Figure 1. In this multi-level system, the transit 
authority aims to determine simultaneously the optimal number of operators and to allocate 
the new transit lines to bidders in a way that maximizes the total social welfare of the transit 
system. However, the authority is not willing to subsidize the transit operators, but rather 
wants them to be able to survive in a competitive market. This is often the case in many large 
Asian cities with high density populated development, such as Hong Kong. The transit 
operators in the market seek to maximize their own profits by adjusting their service fares and 
frequencies, while accounting for the transit passengers’ travel choice decisions that minimize 
their own perceived disutility of travel. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic assumptions and 
notation are described. Section 3 presents the model formulation and solution algorithm. 
Section 4 provides a numerical example to illustrate the application of the proposed model. 
Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5 together with recommendations for further studies. 
 
2 Basic considerations 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
 
To facilitate the presentation of the essential ideas without loss of generality, the following 
basic assumptions are made in this paper. 
 
A1 In the transit market, there are L lines, including new and existing lines, and K alternative 
companies or operators that are bidding for the operating rights of new lines. Suppose that all 
the bidders act independently to determine their fares and frequencies. Collusive behavior 
between the bidders is not considered in this paper, but will be explored in a future study. 
 
A2 Each transit operator in the market can operate more than one transit line, but each transit 
line can be allocated to one operator only. This relaxes the strict assumption in Williams and 
Abdulaal (1993) and Williams and Martin (1993) that each operator or company can operate 
one transit line only. 
 
A3 All transit passengers are assumed to be homogenous concerning their values of time 
(VOT) and disutility perception. However, this can easily be relaxed to incorporate passenger 
heterogeneity by introducing a distribution of passenger’s VOT, as done in Yang et al. (2001) 
and Huang and Li (2007). Transit passengers make their travel choice decisions in a stochastic 
manner based on the tradeoff between the service qualities or travel disutilities of different 
transit services. The disutility is measured by the weighted sum of the walking time for access 
to and egress from transit stations, the in-vehicle travel time, the waiting time at transit 
stations, the in-vehicle crowding discomfort, and the fare (De Cea and Fernandez, 1993; Wu 
et al., 1994; Lo et al., 2004; Uchida et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008). 
 
A4 The effects of the scale economies of transit operations are explicitly incorporated into the 
definition of transit operating cost and thus the profit function of transit operators. This 
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relaxes the assumption in many previous related studies, such as that of Uchida et al. (2007) 
and Yang and Woo (2000). They assumed that the transit operating cost was a linear function 
of the service frequency or fleet size. 
 
A5 An elastic demand function is used to capture the responses of passengers to the level of 
transit services and fares. The responses include switching to alternative modes (e.g. auto 
mode) and not making the journey at all (Zhou et al., 2005; Li et al., 2007). 
 
2.2 Notation 
 
Sets 
L   set of all transit lines in the transit market 
| |kL  total number of lines operated by operator k 
L  set of new or additional transit lines 
K  set of transit operators in the transit market 
Variables associated with transit passengers 
D  total resultant passenger demand in the market (passengers/h) 
lD  passenger demand selecting line l (passengers/h) 
D vector of resultant passenger demand;  ,lD l L  D  
l  proportion of passengers selecting line l 
lu  average travel disutility or generalized travel cost on line l (h) 
lw  average waiting time of passengers for using line l (h) 
lg   crowding discomfort cost of passengers in transit vehicles on line l (h) 
Variables associated with transit operators 
lN  transit fleet size or number of transit vehicles on line l (vehicles) 
lf  service frequency of line l (veh/h) 
lp  fare of line l ($) 
k  profit of operator k ($/h) 
( )k    change of operator k’s profit due to an additional line 
y vector of fares and frequencies; ( , )y p f  
p vector of fare;  ,lp l L  p  
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f vector of service frequency;  ,lf l L  f  
Variables associated with transit authority 
lkx  0-1 variable; equal to 1 if line l is allocated to operator k and 0 otherwise 
x vector of the 0-1 variable lkx ;  , ,lkx l L k K   x  
Constants 
lC   capacity of transit vehicle (including seats and standees) on line l (passengers/veh) 
D  potential (latent) passenger demand in the transit market (passengers/h) 
ld  total walking distance for access to and egress from transit stations on line l (km) 
0 1,   parameters in the in-vehicle crowding discomfort cost function 
Ll  length of line l (km) 
lt  average in-vehicle travel time on line l (h) 
lT  cycle journey time of a transit vehicle on line l (h) 
l  average walking time for access to and egress from transit stations on line l (h) 
Vl  average operating speed of transit vehicles on line l (km/h) 
  average walking speed of passengers (km/h) 
  expected disutility of using the transit services (h) 
0
k  fixed cost per unit of transit line for operator k ($/h) 
l  (variable) operating cost per vehicle-hour on line l ($/veh-h) 
0  value of in-vehicle travel time ($/h) 
1  value of walking time ($/h) 
2  value of waiting time ($/h) 
3  value of in-vehicle crowding discomfort ($/h) 
  demand dispersion parameter in the elastic demand function (1/h) 
   parameter for representing the perception variation of passengers on travel disutility 
  parameter for capturing the effects of the scale economies of transit operations 
 
3 Model formulation 
 
Consider a transit market that consists of the commuting trips between an origin-destination 
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(OD) pair that connects H (a residential area) and W (a workplace) in an urban central area. 
As previously stated, there are three types of players in the transit market, i.e., the transit 
passengers, the transit operators, and the transit authority. They constitute a multi-level 
hierarchical decision system. The decision variables associated with them are, respectively, 
transit service choice, service fares and frequencies, and number of operators and allocation of 
new transit lines. These can be formulated as three interrelated sub-models, i.e., the transit 
passenger travel choice sub-model, the transit operator optimal fare and frequency sub-model, 
and the transit authority optimal number of operators and allocation of lines sub-model. In the 
following, these three sub-models are presented in order. 
 
3.1 Transit passenger travel choice sub-model 
 
According to A3, transit passengers choose transit services based on their own perceptions of 
the service quality or the disutility of the transit services. A multinomial logit formulation has 
often been adopted in the previous studies to model transit passenger travel choice behavior 
(Lam et al. 1999, 2002; Lo et al., 2000; Uchida et al., 2007). With the use of a logit-type 
formulation, the passenger demand, lD , selecting line l can be determined by 
exp( ) ,   
exp( )
l
l l
ll
uD D D l L
u
     ,  (1) 
where L is the set of all transit lines in the market, including new and existing lines, D  is the 
total resultant passenger demand in the market, l  is the proportion of passengers selecting 
line l, and lu  is the average disutility or generalized travel cost on line l. The parameter   
represents the variation in passenger perceptions of travel disutility. The higher the value of 
 , the smaller the variation in passenger perceptions, and vice versa. 
 
The average travel disutility lu , measured in terms of equivalent time units, on line l is 
composed of the average walking time l  for access to and egress from transit stations, the 
average in-vehicle travel time lt , the average passenger waiting time at stations lw , the 
in-vehicle crowding discomfort cost lg , and fare lp , i.e., 
31 2
0 0 0 0
1 ,   l l l l l lu t w g p l L
            , (2) 
where the parameters 0 , 1 , 2  and 3  are, respectively, the value of in-vehicle travel 
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time, the value of walking time, the value of waiting time and the value of crowding 
discomfort of passengers, which are all measured in monetary value per unit time.  
 
The average in-vehicle travel time lt  depends on the length Ll  of line l and the average 
operating speed Vl  of transit vehicles on line l, expressed as 
L ,   
V
l
l
l
t l L   ,  (3) 
where the average vehicle operating speed Vl  is calculated on the basis of the whole journey 
time including boarding and alighting times at transit stations (Yang and Woo, 2000). 
 
The average walking time l  of passengers using line l can be determined by the total 
walking distance ld  for access to and egress from transit stations on line l divided by the 
average walking speed   of passengers, i.e., 
,   ll
d l L    .  (4) 
 
The average passenger waiting time lw  on line l can be estimated by 
,   l
l
w l L
f
   , (5) 
where lf  is the service frequency of line l. The value of   is dependent on the distributions 
of transit vehicle headways and passenger arrival times. The typical value of   adopted in 
the literature is 0.5, with an assumption of a uniform random arrival distribution of passengers 
and a constant transit vehicle headway (Lam and Morrall, 1982). 
 
Similar to Wu et al. (1994), Lo et al. (2004), and Uchida et al. (2007), the in-vehicle crowding 
discomfort cost, lg , measured in terms of generalized time units, can be expressed as a 
function of passenger volume on line l and the capacity of vehicle on line l, formulated as 
1
0 ,   ll l
l l
Dg t l L
f C
      
, (6) 
where 0  and 1  are constants, lC  is the vehicle capacity (including seats and standees) 
on line l, and l lf C  is the total capacity of line l. lt  can be calculated by Equation (3). 
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To capture the responses of passengers to the level of transit services and fares, an 
exponential form of elastic demand function, which is widely used in transport models (Zhou 
et al., 2005; Li et al., 2007), is adopted and specified as 
exp( )D D  , (7) 
where D  is the potential (latent) passenger demand in the transit market and   is the 
expected disutility of using the transit services.   is the demand dispersion parameter that 
reflects the demand sensitivity to the expected disutility of the transit services. According to 
the random utility theory,   can be measured by the following log-sum formula (Oppenheim, 
1995) 
1 ln exp( )l
l L
u

     . (8) 
 
It should be pointed out that for given transit fares and frequencies, according to Equations 
(1)-(8), the passenger demand lD , l L   on line l is a function of the travel disutility 
lu , l L  , which would be affected by the crowding discomfort cost lg , which is a function 
of the passenger demand lD , l L   itself in terms of Equation (6). Therefore, the passenger 
travel choice sub-model can be formulated as a fixed-point problem with regard to the 
passenger demand lD , l L  . 
 
Proposition 1 (The passenger travel choice sub-model). For a given transit fare and frequency 
pattern, the logit-based passenger travel choice sub-model is equivalent to finding a vector 
*D , such that the following fixed-point problem holds. 
* * *( ) ,     D F D 0 D  (9) 
with  ,lD l L  D ,  ( ) ,lD l L   F D  and { | , }ll D D l L    D .  
 
Remark 1. The crowding discomfort cost function (6) and the elastic demand function (7) in 
this paper are assumed to be continuous. Consequently, the feasible set   is closed because 
the OD demand is bounded, thus there exists at least one solution to the fixed-point problem 
(9) according to the Brouwer’s fixed-point theory. Moreover, it is easily proved that the 
uniqueness of the model solution can be guaranteed if the discomfort cost function and the 
elastic demand function are strictly monotone (Patriksson, 1994). The fixed-point problem (9) 
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can be solved effectively by using the solution algorithm recently proposed by Huang and Li 
(2007), which is based on the method of successive averages (MSA) in conjunction with the 
logit-type assignment process. 
 
3.2 Transit operator optimal fare and frequency sub-model 
 
In Hong Kong, over 90% of the 11 million daily person trips are served by privately operated 
transit services (Transport Department, 2003). The transit industry in Hong Kong operates 
profitably without government subsidy. This is different from the situation in most Western 
cities in which the transit industry is often subsidized by the local government due to 
insufficient ridership. Under such a profitable operating environment in Hong Kong, the 
principal objective of the private transit operators is neither welfare gain nor the efficient 
utilization of road space, but rather profit maximization. Consequently, these privately owned 
transit operators compete against each other for maximizing their patronage and revenues 
(Zhou et al., 2005). 
 
The net profit of a transit operator is the total revenue that is generated from the passenger 
fares minus the total transit service operating costs. For formulating the net profit obtained by 
a transit operator, we let 
1   if line  is operated by operator ,
0  otherwise.lk
l k
x     (10) 
The net profit, k , of operator k can then be expressed as 
     0, ( ) ,   k kk l l lk k lk l l lk
l L l L l L
p D x x N x k K


  
               
  y y y , (11) 
where K is the set of all operators in the transit market.  ,k k ky p f  is the vector of the fare 
and frequency of operator k, and  ,k k k  y p f  is that of the other operators excluding k. 
0
k  is the fixed cost per unit of transit line for operator k. l lN  is the variable operating cost 
on line l, where l  is the operating cost per vehicle-hour on line l and lN  is the transit fleet 
size or number of transit vehicles on line l. lN  can be determined by l l lN T f , where lT  
is the cycle journey time of a transit vehicle on line l and 2L Vl l lT  . 
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Remark 2. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (11) represents the total revenue 
of operator k. The square brackets represent the total cost of operator k, which consists of the 
fixed cost (i.e. the first term in the bracket) and the variable operating cost (i.e. the second 
term in the bracket) that is proportional to the total vehicle-hours (Yang and Woo, 2000). 
According to White (2002), the fixed cost consists of the capital costs for building the depot 
and providing other fixed assets, overhead and administration costs of the offices etc. It is 
related to the total number of lines (i.e. lkl L x ) that are operated by an operator. The 
variable operating cost includes the fuel costs, vehicle maintenance costs, crew wages, tires, 
and insurance etc. 
 
Remark 3. According to Berechman and Giuliano (1985), the exponent   ( 0.0 1.0   ) in 
Equation (11) can be introduced to capture the effects of the scale economics of transit 
operations, as shown in Figure 2. In this figure, 0  is the fixed cost per unit of transit line. It 
can be seen in Figure 2 that when 1.0  , the total fixed cost is a linear function of the total 
number of lines that are operated by an operator (i.e. lkl L x ), implying that the effects of 
the scale economies of transit operations are not considered. When 0.0  , the total fixed 
cost is a constant independent of the total number of lines operated. When 0.0 1.0   , the 
fixed cost that results from an additional transit line service (i.e. the marginal cost) decreases 
as the total number of lines operated increases. Hence, the parameter   ( 0.0 1.0   ) can 
indeed capture the effects of the scale economies of transit services. In particular, for a given 
number of lines, the smaller the value of  , the larger the scale economies, and vice versa. 
 
In a competitive transit market, profit-driven operators have to decide their service fares and 
frequencies carefully to compete with other operators so as to maximize their own profits. 
Clearly, the profit obtained by an operator depends significantly on the strategies adopted by 
the other competitors and the responses of passengers in the transit market. At the same time, 
the strategies adopted by one operator have a significant impact on the strategies of the 
competitors and on the travel choice behavior of passengers. In turn, the subsequent effects on 
the passenger demand share over transit lines would affect the profits of the operator itself. 
This leads to an oligopolistic competitive equilibrium or a Cournot-Nash game between 
operators. 
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Proposition 2 (The transit operator optimal fare and frequency sub-model). The equilibrium 
fares and frequencies of operator k in an oligopolistic competitive market can be obtained by 
the following maximization problem. 
  
{ }
max   , , , ,   
k
k k k k
k k K
   
y
y y D y y , (12) 
where the passenger demand vector  ,k kD y y  can be determined by the passenger travel 
choice sub-model (9). 
 
To search the oligopoly solution resulting from the competition between K operators, a 
diagonalization method here is developed. The basic idea of this method is to solve the 
individual maximization problem (12) of the operators separately and sequentially, holding 
the decision variables of the other operators fixed in turn until the sequence converges. This 
method is heuristic, and thus cannot guarantee that the solution is a global optimum. The 
step-by-step procedure is given as follows. 
 
Step 0.  Initialization. Choose an initial fare and frequency pattern 
(1) (1){ , 1, 2,..., }k k K y y  for all K operators. Set iteration counter n = 1. 
Step 1.  Determination of passenger demand pattern. Determine the passenger demand 
pattern ( )( ) { }nn lDD  by the passenger travel choice sub-model (9). 
Step 2.  Diagonalization. Solve the transit operator sub-model (12) independently for all K 
operators, one then obtains the fare and frequency pattern 
( 1) ( 1){ , 1, 2,..., }n k n k K  y y . 
Step 3.  Convergence check. If ( 1) ( )|| || ,k n k n   y y 1,2,...,k K , where   is a 
pre-specified tolerance, then stop. Otherwise, set n = n +1, and go to Step 1. 
 
3.3 Transit authority sub-model 
 
As previously stated, the transit authority aims to determine the optimal number of operators 
and to allocate new transit lines to bidders in a way that maximizes the total social welfare of 
the transit system. At the same time, it is not willing to subsidize the transit operators, but 
rather expects them to be able to survive in the competitive market. Transit operators, as profit 
maximizing entities, are not obliged to serve the lines the transit authority allows them to bid. 
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That is, a transit operator may not serve that line if its (marginal) profit decreases by serving 
this extra line. Consequently, the objective of the authority is, in fact, to determine an optimal 
line-operator matrix (referred to as the decision matrix in this paper), as shown in Equation 
(13), that maximizes the total social welfare, subject to the constraint that the profit of each 
operator is non-decreasing with the introduction of an additional line. 
 
1 2
11 12 1 11
21 22 2 22
1 2
1 2
                                 k K
k K
k K
lk L K
l l lk lKl
L L Lk LKL
O O O O
x x x xL
x x x xL
x
x x x xL
x x x xL

           
 
 
     
 
     
 
  (13) 
 
The decision matrix is an L K  matrix, where L  is the set of new transit lines to be 
allocated. Each row of the matrix is associated with a new line ( lL ), and each column is 
associated with a bidder ( kO ). Each element lkx  in the matrix is a binary variable, i.e., 
  lkx = 0 or 1, ,l L k K   . (14) 
According to A2, each line can be allocated to one bidder only, thus implying that the sum of 
all the elements in each row of the decision matrix is equal to one, i.e.,  
  1,   lk
k
x l L   .  (15) 
In addition, an operator expects to bid an extra line if and only if the marginal profit due to the 
additional line is nonnegative, i.e., 
    | 1|,| | 0,   k kk L L k K    y ,  (16) 
where ( )k   is the change of operator k’s profit caused by an additional line, and | |kL  is 
the total number of lines that are being operated by operator k. 
 
The total social welfare of the transit system is the sum of the consumer surplus and the 
producer surplus. Following Williams and Abdulaal (1993) and Evans (1987), the consumer 
surplus can be represented by ( D  ), measured in time units. It expresses the perceived 
benefits experienced by the potential passenger demand. The producer surplus is the total 
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profits of all transit operators in the network, i.e., kk , measured in monetary units. 
Consequently, we obtain the following transit authority sub-model. 
 
Proposition 3 (The transit authority sub-model). The optimal number of operators and the 
allocation of new transit lines can be obtained by solving the following maximization 
problem. 
         0
{ }
max   Z , ( )
lk
k
x k K
D

   D u y x Φ y x y x ,    (17) 
subject to     (14)-(16), (18) 
where x is the vector that consists of the elements in the decision matrix  lkx . Vectors D 
and Φ , which are the functions in x through y, can be determined by the passenger 
sub-model (9) and the operator sub-model (12), respectively. 0  (see Equation (2)) is the 
passenger’s value of time that is used to convert time into monetary cost. 
 
The transit authority sub-model (17)-(18) is a 0-1 integer programming problem with the 
binary variable lkx  as the decision variable. Note that only one element in each row of the 
decision matrix  lkx  is 1, and all other elements in the same row are zero (see Equation 
(15)). This characteristic of the decision matrix significantly reduces the size of the feasible 
solution space. In view of this, an implicit enumeration solution algorithm can be developed 
to solve the transit authority problem (17)-(18). The basic idea behind this algorithm is to 
execute repeatedly a step-by-step procedure for maximizing the objective function (17), by 
examining the local conditions but considering one input at a time. At each step, a decision is 
made about whether a particular input is an optimal solution. The step-by-step procedure of 
the solution algorithm is given as follows. 
 
Step 0.  Initialization. Choose an initial feasible solution, for example, allocate all new lines 
to a single operator (say, operator k). Set Z    (i.e., the lower bound of the 
objective function (17)). 
Step 1.  First loop operation. Set iteration counter j = 1. 
Step 2.  Second loop operation. Set the level (or new line to be allocated) counter l = 1. 
Step 3.  Third loop operation. At level l, check all K allocations sequentially in each of 
which line l is allocated to one operator. Set the operator counter k = 1. 
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Step 3.1. If k K , then go to Step 4. 
Step 3.2. Use the operator sub-model (12) and the passenger sub-model (9) to determine the 
fare and frequency pattern ( ) ( ) ( ){ , }k k ky p f , the corresponding passenger demand 
pattern ( )( ) { }kk lDD , and the travel disutility ( )( ) { }kk luu . Then, calculate the 
value ( )Z k  of the objective function (17). 
Step 3.3. Termination check for the third loop operation. If ( )Z Zk   and ( ) 0,k    
k K  , then put * ( )ky y , * ( )kD D , * ( )Z Z k , k = k +1, and go to Step 3.1. 
Otherwise, set k = k +1, and go to Step 3.1. 
Step 4.  Termination check for the second loop operation. If l L , then go to Step 5. 
Otherwise, set l = l +1, and go to Step 3. 
Step 5.  Termination check for the first loop operation. Repeat Steps 2-4. If no better 
solution can be found for a complete search across the L  new lines, then terminate 
the algorithm and output the optimal solution * * *{ , , }x y D  and the corresponding 
objective function value *Z . Otherwise, set j = j +1, and go to Step 2. 
 
It should be pointed out that the proposed implicit enumeration algorithm determines a 
solution by a sequence of decisions, each of which searchs for the best solution at that stage. 
That is, each decision is locally optimal. Therefore, the proposed solution algorithm cannot 
guarantee the solution is a global optimum, but offers a heuristic method of finding an 
approximate but acceptable solution to the line allocation problem. 
 
3.4 Summary of the model and solution algorithms 
 
In the previous sections, we have formulated three interrelated sub-models that are associated 
with three types of players in the transit market, respectively. The solution algorithms for 
these three sub-models are also discussed and presented. For the convenience of readers, the 
interactions among the three sub-models together with the solution algorithms are further 
summarized in Table 1. It can be seen in Table 1 that the input of a sub-model is the outputs 
of the other two sub-models, and vice versa. The solution algorithm consists of three stages, 
each of which is corresponding to solving one of the three sub-models. The solution algorithm 
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proposed in our paper is a heuristic algorithm, thus a global optimum solution is not always 
guaranteed. 
 
4 Numerical studies 
 
To facilitate the presentation of the essential ideas and illustrate the contributions of this 
paper, we apply the proposed model and solution algorithm to a simple transit network. We 
explore the effects of the allocation of additional lines on the equilibrium fares and 
frequencies of the operators and on the transit system performance. The effects of the scale 
economies of transit operations and the market demand levels are also explored.  
 
4.1 Problem setting 
 
The example transit network is shown in Figure 3. There are four alternative transit lines that 
connect residential area H with workplace W. The dashed lines represent the walk links for 
access to or egress from transit stations. Lines L1 and L2 are two existing lines, and Lines L3 
and L4 are two newly constructed lines. The numbers shown beside the lines in Figure 3 are 
the lengths of the corresponding lines. Suppose that the two existing lines L1 and L2 are 
being operated by Operator A. Two operators from outside of the market (Operators B and C) 
and Operator A inside the market (a total of three profit-driven operators) are bidding for the 
operating rights of the new lines L3 and L4.  
 
According to the discussion in the previous sections, the simultaneous optimization problem 
for the number of operators and the allocation of new lines is equivalent to the determination 
of the following decision matrix. 
3 3 33
4 4 44
        A B C
A B C
A B C
O O O
x x xL
x x xL
   
,  (19) 
where each element in the matrix is 0 or 1, and the sum of all the elements in each row is 1. 
 
Different bidders or operators can be characterized to some extent by their sizes or market 
shares (in terms of number of lines operated). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 
Operator A is the largest company, followed by Operator B and then Operator C. In this 
example, the numbers of lines that are being operated by the three operators (excluding the 
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two new lines L3 and L4) are assumed to be 300, 150, and 15, respectively. Consequently, for 
a given value of   ( 0.0 1.0   ), the scale economies of Operators A, B, and C decrease in 
order of their sizes, that is, the scale economy of Operator A is largest, that of Operator C is 
smallest, and that of Operator B somewhere in between. 
 
Suppose that the average walking speed of passengers and the length for each of the walk 
links are 5 km/h and 0.1 km, respectively. The average operating speed of the vehicles and the 
vehicle capacity of each operator are 18 km/h and 120 passengers/veh, respectively. The fixed 
cost, 0 , per unit of transit line for each operator is $2,000/h. The variable operating cost,  , 
per vehicle-hour is $50/veh-hour. The coefficients of the disutility function in Equation (2) 
are: 0 5.0  , 1 10.0  , 2 10.0  , and 3 7.5   ($/h). The other model parameters are: 
3000D  , 0.5  , 1.0  , 0.5  , 0 0.02   and 1 2.0  . In the following analysis, 
unless specifically stated otherwise, these input data and the model parameter values are 
considered as the reference case. 
 
4.2 Analyses of results 
 
The proposed solution algorithm was coded in programming language C and run on a 
personal computer with an Intel Pentium 1.4-GHz CPU and 256 MB of random-access 
memory (RAM). The iterative process of the solution algorithm is as follows: for a given 
allocation scheme for the new line L3 (e.g. L3 is allocated to Operator A), the proposed 
algorithm sequentially checks the alternative allocation schemes for the new line L4, 
considering one input at a time (i.e. L4 is allocated to one alternative operator at a time). Then, 
the allocation scheme for L3 is updated (e.g. L3 is allocated to the next operator), and the 
alternative schemes for L4 are again sequentially checked one input at a time. The process is 
repeated until the value of objective function (17) cannot be further increased. The iterative 
process for the reference case takes about 52 seconds of CPU time. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the impacts of the introduction of the new transit lines L3 and L4 on the 
transit system when D  and   are fixed as 3000 pass/h and 0.5, respectively. Note that 
before the introduction of lines L3 and L4, the transit market is a monopolistic one in which 
there is only one operator (i.e. Operator A), which operates the two existing lines: L1 and L2. 
After the introduction of lines L3 and L4, Operators B and C join the market for bidding the 
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additional lines, thus leading to the oligopolistic competition between operators. As a result of 
the competition, the additional allocation leads to a sharp decrease in the fares of the existing 
transit services, as shown in Table 2. Specifically, the fares of lines L1 and L2 decrease from 
$9.9 to $6.3 and from $10.0 to $6.4, respectively, thus causing a slight decrease in their 
corresponding service frequencies. 
 
Table 2 also shows that the new line L3 (10 km length) is allocated to Operator B (a 
medium-scale company), and the new line L4 (15 km length) is allocated to Operator C (a 
small-scale company). That is, short-haul lines are allocated to larger companies, whereas 
long-haul lines are allocated to smaller companies. This means that the optimal allocation 
scheme of the additional lines depends on the company sizes of bidders. An investigation of 
this impact would make an interesting and important research topic, but is outside the scope 
of this paper and thus left to a future study. In addition, the fares (or frequencies) of lines L1 
and L2 are higher (or lower) than those of lines L3 and L4, respectively. This is because 
among the three bidders, Operator A has the largest market share (almost 50%) to an extent 
that gives it significant market power in setting fares. 
 
Table 3 shows the effects of the addition of the new lines L3 and L4 on the transit system 
performance, in terms of the total resultant market demand, total system profit and the social 
welfare of the system. It can be seen in Table 3 that after the introduction of lines L3 and L4, 
all these performances concerned dramatically increase. Specifically, the resultant market 
demand increases to 2,076 from 998 (pass/h), the total system profit increases to 10,116 from 
8,918 ($/h), and the social welfare increases to 30,857 from 18,895 ($/h). 
 
Table 4 shows the impacts of the scale economies of transit operations and the market demand 
levels. Two different values are specified for the scale economy parameter   and the 
potential market demand level D . The two values of the parameter   are 0.5 and 1.0, 
respectively. 1.0   is actually associated with a case that does not consider the effects of 
the scale economies. The two potential market demand levels are 3,000 and 6,000 pass/h, 
respectively. It can be seen in Table 4 that when 1.0   at the low potential demand level 
(i.e., 3,000 pass/h), the two new lines L3 and L4 are simultaneously allocated to Operator B, 
and Operator C, which is a small-scale company, has no incentive to join the market, thus 
leaving just two operators (i.e. Operators A and B). This is because if the effects of the scale 
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economies are ignored at such a low demand level, then the profit of Operator C decreases 
from the additional line services due to the overestimated operating cost. However, when the 
effects of the scale economies are considered (i.e., 0.5  ), then Operator C can achieve a 
positive profit increase by serving an extra line. This indicates that ignoring the effects of the 
scale economies can lead an authority to make a biased decision. 
 
Table 4 also shows that when the potential demand level is doubled (i.e., D  increases from 
3,000 to 6,000 pass/h), Operator C has the incentive of positive profit to join the market, 
regardless of whether the effects of scale economies are considered or not. This means that 
the market demand levels have an important impact on the optimal number of operators and 
the allocation of new lines as well. In particular, when 1.0  , allocating either one of the 
new lines L3 and L4 to Operator B and the other to Operator C yields the same system 
performance, both in terms of the total resultant market demand, total system profit and social 
welfare. This is because when 1.0  , the operating costs of Operator B and C are linear 
with regard to the number of lines that they operate and the service frequencies that they set. 
However, when 0.5  , the short-haul line L3 is allocated to the larger company (Operator 
B) and the long-haul line L4 is allocated to the smaller company (Operator C). Table 4 also 
shows that for a given potential demand level, the total system profit and the social welfare 
when 1.0   is smaller than when 0.5  . This is because ignoring the effects of scale 
economies leads to the overestimation of the transit operating costs and thus the 
underestimation of the benefits or profits of transit operations and the social welfare of the 
transit system. 
 
5 Conclusion and future studies 
 
This paper has proposed a new model for simultaneous optimization of the number of 
operators and the allocation of new transit lines in an oligopolistic transit market. The 
proposed model addressed the interaction among the transit authority, transit operators, and 
transit passengers and also explicitly incorporated the impacts of the scale economics of the 
transit operations. On the basis of a multi-level hierarchical system framework, the proposed 
model was formulated as a 0-1 integer programming problem which can be solved by an 
implicit enumeration algorithm. The proposed model provides a useful tool for modeling 
competitive transit services and evaluating transit policies at the strategic level. 
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A numerical example was used to illustrate the application of the proposed model and solution 
algorithm and to assess the impacts of the additional allocation of new transit lines, the scale 
economies and the market demand levels. Some new insights and important findings have 
been obtained, as follows. (1) The introduction of new transit lines significantly influences the 
equilibrium fares and frequencies of the existing transit services and the transit system 
performances, in terms of the total resultant market demand, total system profit and social 
welfare. For example, after the introduction of new lines, both the fares and frequencies of the 
existing transit services are reduced. (2) The optimal allocation scheme of new transit lines is 
related to the company sizes of bidders or operators. (3) Both the scale economies and the 
market demand level have significant impacts on the optimal number of operators and the 
allocation schemes of new lines. In particular, ignoring the effects of scale economies would 
underestimate the benefits of transit operations and the social welfare of the system. Hence, 
the transit authority may make a biased decision in allocating new transit lines to competitive 
bidders. 
 
It should be pointed out that, although the numerical results that are presented in this paper are 
sensible, case studies on large and realistic transit networks are necessary to further justify the 
findings of this paper and the performance of the proposed model. Other relevant issues that 
we are currently investigating include a consideration of collusive behavior between different 
operators (Williams and Martin, 1993; Ibeas et al., 2006), the explicit incorporation of the 
effects of transit service unreliability (Bell et al., 2002; Li et al., 2008) and passenger 
heterogeneity (Yang et al., 2001), the optimization of transit fleet size (Ceder, 2005), and the 
development of efficient solution algorithms for solving the simultaneous optimization 
problem in large-scale transit networks. 
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Table 1 Summary of three interrelated sub-models and associated solution algorithms 
Transit authority sub-model (Proposition 3) 
Output: allocation of lines (x) 
Input: service fare (P), frequency (f), and passenger demand on each line (D) 
Solution algorithm: see Section 3.3 
Transit operator optimal fare and frequency sub-model (Proposition 2) 
Output: transit service fare (P) and frequency (f) 
Input: allocation of lines (x), and passenger demand on each line (D) 
Solution algorithm: see Section 3.2 
Transit passenger travel choice sub-model (Proposition 1) 
Output: passenger demand on each line (D) 
Input: allocation of lines (x), service fare (P) and frequency (f) 
Solution algorithm: see Section 3.1 and Huang and Li (2007) 
 
 
Table 2 Optimal allocation schemes of lines, fares and frequencies before and after 
introduction of new lines 
 Operator Optimal allocation scheme of lines 
Fare  
($) 
Frequency 
(veh/h) 
Before the introduction 
of new transit lines 
(monopoly market) 
A 
L1 9.9 7.6 
L2 10.0 5.3 
After the introduction 
of new transit lines 
(oligopoly market) 
A L1 6.3 7.3 L2 6.4 5.1 
B L3 5.8 7.8 
C L4 5.6 5.6 
 
 
Table 3 Resultant system performances before and after introduction of new lines 
 Resultant market demand (pass/h) 
Profit  
($/h) 
Social welfare 
($/h) 
Before the introduction 
of new transit lines 
(monopoly market) 
998 8,918 18,895 
After the introduction 
of new transit lines 
(oligopoly market) 
A: 959 
B: 637 
C: 480 
Total: 2,076 
A: 5,170 
B: 3,179 
C: 1,767 
Total: 10,116 
30,857 
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Table 4 Effects of scale economies and market demand levels on transit system 
Potential 
demand 
level 
(pass/h) 
Optimal number of 
operators 
Resultant 
market demand 
(pass/h) 
Total profit 
($/h) 
Social welfare 
($/h) 
=1.0 =0.5  =1.0 =0.5 =1.0 =0.5 =1.0 =0.5 
3,000D   
2 
A: L1, L2 
B: L3, L4 
 
3 
A: L1, L2 
B: L3 
C: L4 
1,971 2,076 6,522 10,116 22,973 30,857 
6,000D 
 
3 
A: L1, L2 
B: L3 (or L4) 
C: L4 (or L3) 
3 
A: L1, L2 
B: L3 
C: L4 
4,222 4,222 15,564 22,678 57,710 64,899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The hierarchical structure of three types of players in the transit market 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transit authority 
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Fig. 2 Change in the fixed cost of operator k with the number of lines operated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The example transit network 
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